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Abstract
This article highlights a problem which has troubled courts in the United States in recent years, and like most equality
issues arising in US litigation, it is likely  to  trouble  Europe’s  courts  in  due  course.  It  concerns  the  victimisation
provisions expressed in equality legislation, such as the Civil Rights Act 1964 (US),  the  EU  Equality  Directives,  or
the Equality Act 2010 (UK). The problem is that none of them  are  expressed  to  prohibit  the  victimisation  of  third
parties, for instance, dismissing a spouse of a worker who brought a discrimination claim. This “most ancient form  of
vengeance” is designed to deter the worker from pursuing the claim, and will also deter others from complaining, “the
chilling effect”.
This paper identifies a variety of scenarios where a third party could be victimised, highlights the shortcomings in the
equality  Directives,  and  searches  for  solutions  in  EU  law  and  the  European  Convention  of  Human  Rights.  It
concludes that  the  best  existing  solution  lies  in  EU  general  principles,  but  for  the  sake  of  certainty,  a  simple
amendment to the existing legislative formulas is required, which would resolve the problem without any undue  side-
effects.
Introduction
When a torturer is presented with an obstinate and patriotic spy, prepared to give up his life rather than his  secret,  the
torturer has one masterstroke left. He will threaten instead to harm the spy’s spouse or children. We only have to  step
into the shoes of the spy for a second to realise that the pressure has been increased a hundredfold -  at  the  least.  The
point for the present purpose is that sometimes a person can be more effectively coerced by a threat to others.
In the context of employment law, this practice has been characterised thus:
“To retaliate against a man by hurting a member of his family is an ancient  method  of  revenge,  and  is  not
unknown in the field of labor relations.”[1]
This form of victimisation has all the  consequences  associated  with  the  more  familiar  forms  of
victimisation taken against the principal complainant. It will deter the complainant and others. The seriousness of  this
“chilling effect” was highlighted recently by the US Supreme Court:
“This is no imaginary horrible given the  documented  indications  that  ‘[f]ear  of  retaliation  is  the  leading
reason why people stay silent instead of voicing their concerns about bias and discrimination.’”[2]
In the field of discrimination, many scenarios could arise. Here, they have been grouped into three Classes.
A worker issues discrimination proceedings against her employer (the “protected act”) and:
Class No. 1: Same employer - same workplace.
In retaliation, the employer  fires  the  worker’s  fiancé  (who  worked  for  the  same  employer  in  the  same
workplace).
Variations on this would be that the retaliation falls short of dismissal (e.g. failure to promote,
a poor appraisal, a move to less desirable work, or  to  a  less  desirable  location),  or  that  the  victim  is  the
claimant’s spouse, civil partner, relative, close friend, or a work colleague.
Class No. 2: Same  employer  -  different  workplace.  As  above,  save  that  the  fiancé  worked  for  another
business owned or managed by the same employer.
Class No. 3:  Different  employer.  As  above,  save  that  the  fiancé  worked  for  an  undertaking  owned  or
managed by a friend or relative of the employer, who fired him (or otherwise retaliated) on the say-so  of  the
employer, or tacitly, out of sympathy.
In these scenarios, the employer’s action would  deter  either  the  claimant,  or  other  workers,  or
both, from complaining  about  discrimination.  The  US  Civil  Rights  Act  1964  outlaws  less  favourable
treatment   of   a   worker   “because    he    has...”    opposed    discrimination    or    participated    in    discrimination
proceedings.[3] There are many reported cases of third party victimisation the United States, and with the issue yet to
rise to the Supreme Court, the Circuits are split. Some have taken a purposive approach, recognising  victimisation  of
someone “so closely related to or associated with the [plaintiff] ... that it would discourage that person  from  pursuing
[her claim]”.[4] But other Circuits have taken a literal approach and do not recognise such  claims.[5]  There  are  yet
no reported cases in the ECJ or in the UK. This disparity in reported incidents is probably  explained  by  the  “fire-at-
will” doctrine prevalent in the US, where there is little or no protection against unjustified dismissal. Some courts fear
that recognising third party victimisation would put an abnormal burden on US employers to justify dismissals, save a
dismissed worker suddenly claim to be somehow connected with the principal complainant.[6]
This article will explore: the potential to  address  third  party  victimisation  by  alternative  claims,  the  EU  equality
Directives, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and the ECJ’s general principles of effective judicial
protection and equality. It concludes that the best existing solution lies in EU general principles,  but  for  the  sake  of
certainty, a simple amendment to the existing legislative formula is required, which would solve the problem  without
any undue side-effects.
Alternative Claims
Although not generally available in the United States, an obvious alternative claim for the third party victim is a claim
of unjustified dismissal, which is a statutory right provided to workers in most European states.[7] There  are  several
drawbacks with this remedy. First and most obviously, not all victimisation will amount to a dismissal, as noted in the
variations to Class 1 (above). Second, these  rights  normally  will  have  a  narrower  application  than  discrimination
rights.  For  instance,  many  European  countries  operate  probationary,  or  qualifying,  periods  for  these   worker’s
rights.[8] Third, it is common for there to be cap  on  compensation  for  a  breach  of  these  rights,[9]  again,  unlike
discrimination law.[10] In these situations, an unjustified dismissal claim will not be available, or where  it  is,  it  will
provide an incomplete remedy.
Another potential solution is that the principal complainant sues for the victimisation  of,  say,  her  husband.  The
logic here is that the principal victim has been harmed by his employer (through the treatment of her spouse)  because
she complained of discrimination. The most likely harm is of course,  a  fall  in  the  household  income,  and  perhaps
injury to her feelings. This also presents - at best - an incomplete remedy, as a  court  could  not  award  damages  that
would reflect fully the loss suffered by her spouse.[11]
European Union Equality Directives
Victimisation
The principal equality Directives are the  Race  Directive,  the  “Framework”  Directive  (covering  religion  or  belief,
sexual orientation, disability, and age), and the “Recast” Gender Equality Directive.
Recital (20) of the preamble to the Race Directive 2000/43/EC[12] provides: “The  effective  implementation  of  the
principle of equality requires adequate judicial protection against victimisation.” Article 9 continues:
Victimisation
Member States shall introduce into their national legal systems  such  measures  as  are  necessary  to  protect
individuals  from  any  adverse  treatment  or  adverse  consequence  as  a  reaction   to   a   complaint   or   to
proceedings aimed at enforcing compliance with the principle of equal treatment.
The Framework Directive 2000/78/EC [13] repeats the same Recital in its preamble, but the  formula,  provided
by Article 11, is couched in more restrictive terms:
Member States shall introduce ... measures as are necessary to protect employees against dismissal  or
other adverse treatment by the employer as a reaction to a complaint within the undertaking  or  to  any  legal
proceedings aimed at enforcing compliance with the principle of equal treatment.
The formula in Recast Directive 2006/54/EC[14] is substantially  the  same.  The  history  of  these  formulas  can  be
traced  to  Coote  v  Granada.[15]  The   original   sex   discrimination   Directive,   the   Equal   Treatment   Directive
76/207/EEC, did not - except for one specified instance, dismissal,[16] -  expressly  outlaw  victimisation.  However,
victimisation claims falling short of dismissal could succeed under the general ambition of Article 6,  which  provided
that member states should:
“introduce ... such measures as are necessary to  enable  all  persons  who  consider  themselves  wronged  by
failure to apply to them the principle of equal treatment ... to pursue their claims by judicial process ....”
In Coote v Granada, Ms Coote sued her employer following her dismissal for being pregnant. Subsequently, and after
those proceedings were dead, the employer refused to give her a reference and Mrs  Coote  sued  again,  this  time  for
victimisation. The issue was whether Article 6 covered retaliation against former employees. The ECJ  found  for  Ms
Coote, stating:
“The principle of effective judicial control laid down in Article 6 ... would be deprived of an essential part of
its effectiveness if the protection which it provides  did  not  cover  measures  which,  as  in  ...  this  case,  an
employer might take as a reaction to legal proceedings brought by an  employee  with  the  aim  of  enforcing
compliance with the principle of equal treatment. Fear of such measures, where no legal remedy is  available
against them, might deter workers who considered themselves the victims  of  discrimination  from  pursuing
their claims by judicial process, and would consequently be liable seriously to jeopardise  implementation  of
the aim pursued by the Directive.”[17]
It can be seen that some of the language of the first sentence (“as a reaction to”) has been repeated  in  the
subsequent Directives. The policy supporting this, expressed in the second sentence, goes beyond the  facts  of  Coote,
and suggests that any retaliation that might deter workers from using the discrimination laws should be unlawful. This
statement suggests that all three Classes of third party victimisation should be covered.
Similar broad and ambitious sentiments can be found in the  legislative  history.  For  instance,  on
the Race Directive, the Commission stated that the protection against  victimisation  was  “a  crucial
element in allowing individuals to assert their rights”,[18] and when advancing the  role  of  equality  bodies  it  stated
that “many victims of discrimination do not proceed to court with their complaints because of the cost and for  fear  of
victimisation”.[19]  In  relation  to  the  Framework  Directive,  the  Commission  expressed   similar   concern   about
victimisation, but appeared to envisage that the principal complainant and victim was the same person:
“Effective  legal  protection  must  include  protection  against  retaliation.  Victims  may  be   deterred   from
exercising their rights due to the risk of retaliation. Since  fear  of  dismissal  is  generally  one  of  the  major
obstacles to  individual  action,  it  is  necessary  to  protect  individuals  against  dismissal  or  other  adverse
treatment ...”[20]
The Race Directive’s formula is broadly expressed and open enough to  cover  all  three  Classes.  It  requires  adverse
treatment as a reaction to a discrimination complaint or proceedings. There is  nothing  else  limiting  in  this  formula.
But this openness could be explained by the Directive’s reach, which, unlike the  Framework  and  Recast  Directives,
covers areas beyond employment, such as the provision of goods and services.
The Framework and Recast Directives share a common, but narrower, formula. The formula envisages two categories
of the “protected act”: either a complaint within the undertaking or legal proceedings. These categories  differ  in  two
ways. First, one is confined  to  complaints,  while  the  other  is  concerned  with  legal  proceedings.  Second,  one  is
confined  to  internal  complaints  (“within  the  undertaking”),  while  the  other  (“legal  proceedings”)  has  no  such
restriction.
These differences are not easily explainable, and leaves the provisions open to three (rather complex)
interpretations. One possibility is based on the premise that the drafter did  not  envisage  third  party  retaliation.  The
phrase  “within  the  undertaking”  suggests  that  the  victim  must  be  employed  in  the  place  where  the   principal
discrimination was alleged. On this basis, the wording simply  states  the  obvious,  that  complaints  are  internal  and
litigation is external. This interpretation is still broad enough to cover third  party  retaliation  against  workers  within
the undertaking (Class 1), but not workers in another undertaking (Classes 2 and 3).
A   second   interpretation   is   a   step   more   ambitious.   It   relies   on    separating    the    complaint    within    the
undertaking (“internal”) from the legal proceedings. Here, as above, internal complaints remain confined  to  Class  1,
but legal proceedings are not  so  restricted.  And  so,  where  legal  proceedings  are  issued,  retaliation  by  the  same
employer against a worker in another  undertaking  (presumably  owned  or  managed  by  that  employer)  is  covered
(Class 2). This does not extend to retaliation by another employer (Class  3),  because  this  formula  expressly  targets
the employer. This interpretation - of course - produces an anomaly. But its merit lies in it serving, as far as the  literal
wording permits, the  policy,  expressed  in  Coote,  and  in  some  of  the  legislative  history,  to  remove  the  fear  of
deterrents to using the discrimination provisions.
A third and most liberal interpretation is to disassociate both protected acts from  “the  employer”.  The  employer’s
connection with the complaint is no more than a causal one: the employer’s treatment of  the  victim  must  have  been
“as a reaction to” the complaint. As such there is no need for this employer to be the one targeted by the complaint  or
proceedings, as Class 3  envisages.  This  interpretation  effectively  replaces  the  definite  article  in  the  phrase  “the
employer” to read “an employer”. As such, it may fulfil the purpose of the provision, but at the  expense  of  changing
the provision’s wording.
A court may be encouraged by Coleman v Attridge Law,[21] to take this third  interpretation.  In  this  case,  the  ECJ
verified the seemingly elastic concept  of  “association  discrimination”,  which  is  a  form  of  discrimination  on  the
ground of a third party’s protected characteristic. Article 2(1)(a) of the Framework Directive provides:
“direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where one person is treated less favourably than another is,  has
been or would  be  treated  in  a  comparable  situation,  on  any  of  the  grounds  [of  age,  disability,  sexual
orientation, religion or belief].”
The key phrase here is on any of the grounds. There is no possessive adjective. It does not read, for  instance,  “on  the
ground of his disability”. In Coleman, the ECJ held that abusing a worker because of her  child’s  disability  amounted
to  discrimination  and  harassment  against  the   worker,   even   though   she   had   no   disability:   it   was   on   the
ground of disability. In a powerful opinion, the Advocate-General in Coleman asserted: 
“The Directive operates at the level of grounds of discrimination. The wrong that it was intended  to  remedy
is the use of certain characteristics as grounds to treat some employees less well than others; what  it  does  is
to remove religion, age, disability and sexual orientation completely from the range of grounds  an  employer
may legitimately use to treat some people less well.”[22]
Accordingly,  discrimination  on  the  ground  of  the  victim’s  disability  “is  exactly  the   same   in   every   material
aspect”[23] as discrimination on the ground of a third party’s disability. The Court came to the same conclusion,  but
through slightly more technical means, noting  that  some  Articles  of  the  Directive  were  confined  to  the  victim’s
disability, thus squaring the decision with the wording, as well as the purpose, of the Directive.[24]
This  theory  was  taken  a  step   further   by   the   English   Court   of   Appeal   in   English   v   Thomas   Sanderson
Blinds,[25] where it was held that colleagues harassed the claimant on  the  ground  of  sexual  orientation  where  the
claimant was subjected to homophobic harassment, even though: he was not gay, his tormenters knew he was not gay,
and the claimant knew this. Sexual orientation, plainly and crudely, was the nature of the abuse and nothing more.
The   obvious   difference   between   Coleman   and   third   party    victimisation    is    that    the    wording    of    the
victimisation provisions (above) is not so disposed to such a liberal interpretation. Although Coleman was a  powerful
judgment, focussing on the ground of the treatment, rather than the victim’s protected characteristic,  the  Court  faced
no technical obstacles in the wording  of  the  legislation.  But  the  case  does  illustrate  that  recognising  third  party
victimisation is - conceptually - no more ground-breaking than the established notion of third party discrimination and
harassment.
In the UK, the equality legislation has in the past  termed  victimisation  as  a  form  of  discrimination.[26]  The  new
Equality Act 2010 dispenses with this terminology, although the formulaic structure remains much  the  same  for  the
present purpose. At one time, British courts, treated direct  discrimination  and  victimisation  as  “parallel”  causes  of
action, observing, “victimisation is as serious a  mischief  as  direct  discrimination”.[27]  This  again  encourages  an
equally adventurous approach to the victimisation provision. However, more recent authority has  stepped  back  from
making  parallel  interpretations  of  the  discrimination  and  victimisation  provisions.[28]  Further,   the   difference
between  the  UK  statutory  formulas  for  the  present  purpose  is  more  marked  than  the  difference   between   the
Directives’ definitions, with the definition of victimisation expressly restricted to the principal complainant. This is so
even with the new Equality Act 2010, where the drafters had  the  opportunity  to  address  this  issue,  and  chose  not
to.[29]
Third party discrimination
Instead of using the victimisation provisions, it might be argued that Coleman’s broad sweep is enough to  encompass
third  party  victimisation  cases  within  the  more  open-ended  discrimination  provisions.  Where  a  white   man   is
dismissed because of his black wife’s racial harassment complaint,  is  he  not  suffering  discrimination  in  much  the
same way as Ms Coleman? However, not all examples of  third  party  victimisation  compare  so  readily.  Where  the
principal complainant has made an equal pay claim, it becomes less convincing to suggest that that  her  husband  was
fired because of  his  “association”  with  a  woman  (Coleman),  although  it  is  arguable  that  the  victimisation  was
associated with sex, although nobody’s in particular  (English).  The  comparison  becomes  more  tenuous  when  one
considers that it not necessary in direct discrimination cases that the victim  belongs  to  any  protected  group.[30]  It
might be that an employer mistreats a worker because he is not Jewish, or not  black,  and  so  on.  In  these  cases  the
principal complainant  simply  proves  he  does  not  belong  to  the  preferred  group.  Here,  it  would  be  even  more
problematic for a third party victim to show that she was victimised by association with the protected characteristic of
her husband, who brought no characteristic into court himself. The comparisons suffer because of a misplaced  notion
that victimisation is based on a protected characteristic, rather than a protected act. The treatment  is  not  because  the
victim’s friend is black, or female, or gay, (and so on), but because the victim’s friend complained.[31]
This leads to more sweeping objection to the “association discrimination” theory in these cases. Such an interpretation
of the direct discrimination and harassment provisions would in fact encompass all victimisation claims, and so  leave
the victimisation provisions redundant, an interpretation which could not stand.
European Convention on Human Rights
With these rather cumbersome  options,  the  ECJ  may  wish  to  look  further  afield  for  an  express  prohibition  (or
authorization) of third party victimisation. The possibilities include the right to  privacy  under  European  Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR), and the ECJ’s general principles of effective judicial protection and equality.
Article 8 - Right to Privacy
The Right to Privacy provides a perhaps surprising home for at least some employment  cases.  The  question,  in  this
context of unfavourable treatment because of the  victim’s  association  with  the  complainant,  is  what  is  meant  by
“privacy”? The meaning of “private life” is notoriously vague.[32] Even the Court of Human Rights has stated  that  it
is not “possible ... to attempt an exhaustive definition of the notion of ‘private life.’”[33]
There is no case law under Article 8 directly on this victimisation issue. But there are  some  cases
which combine to present a sketch of how Article 8 applies in this context.
First, in Niemietz v Germany[34] the ECtHR said that:
“Respect  for  private  life  must  also  comprise  to  a  certain  degree  the  right   to   establish   and   develop
relationships with other human beings”.[35]
This extends a person’s “private life” beyond a notion of solitary,  or  “private”,  conduct,  to  encompass  contact  and
relationships with others. The  central  issue  in  Niemietz  was  whether  this  right  extended  to  the  workplace,  as  a
lawyer’s business premises had been subjected to a police search. On this point, the Court held that a person’s  private
life included their workplace, because:
“in the course of their working  lives  that  the  majority  of  people  have  a  significant,  if  not  the  greatest,
opportunity of developing relationships with the outside world”.[36]
The Court supported this view with the observation that it was not always easy to distinguish business and social life.
This informs us that Article 8 provides a right to establish  and  develop  human  relationships  in  the  workplace.  By
contrast, in Botta v Italy,[37] the Court held that Article 8 did not extend to a purely social right outside the workplace
(access to a beach) concerning “interpersonal relations of such a  broad  and  indeterminate  scope”  that  there  is  “no
conceivable link” between the State and a person’s private life.
More recently, the ECtHR has built on Niemietz, recognizing that a lifetime ban from  a  chosen  career  could  engage
the Article 8, although it has not gone as far as recognizing an exclusion from a  particular  workplace.  In  Sidabras  v
Lithuania,[38] a “KGB Act” of 1998 was passed under which former KGB  agents  were  given  a  lifetime  ban  from
working in the civil service, and a ten-year ban from  some  parts  of  the  private  sector.  The  Court  found  that  this
engaged Article 8, and its discriminatory application violated Article 14 (discrimination):
“The ban has ... affected the applicants’ ability to  develop  relationships  with  the  outside  world  to  a  very
significant degree, and has created serious difficulties for them as regards the possibility to earn  their  living,
with obvious repercussions on their enjoyment of their private life.”[39]
The widespread ban did not prevent the applicants from taking up some forms of work, but it did effectively bar  them
from their chosen professions (one was a sports instructor and the other a lawyer). This theme  has  been  taken  up  in
two cases from the United Kingdom. In R  (Wright)  v  Secretary  of  State  for  Health,[40]  those  considered  by  the
Secretary of State to be unsuitable to be employed as care workers for vulnerable adults were placed on a list,  and  so
were barred from that occupation. The House of Lords observed that the scope of the  ban  was  “very  wide”[41]  and
held that, without more safeguards, it breached Article 8. Speaking for the House, Baroness Hale stated:
“There will be some people for whom the impact upon personal relationships is so great  as  to  constitute  an
interference with the right to respect for private life and others for whom it may not.”[42]
In R (L) v Metropolitan Police Commissioner[43] the claimant registered with an  employment  agency  to  supervise
schoolchildren. The agency sought an enhanced criminal record certificate, which  disclosed  that  the  claimant  could
not control her son, refused to cooperate with social services, and that  her  son  had  once  been  placed  on  the  child
protection register  and  later  convicted  of  robbery  and  imprisoned.  As  a  consequence,  the  agency  removed  the
claimant from their  books.  Although  no  breach  was  found,  the  Supreme  Court  again  found  that  Article  8  was
engaged.[44] Lord Hope adapted the Sidabras principle:
“Excluding  a  person  from  employment  in  her  chosen  field  is  liable  to  affect  her   ability   to   develop
relationships with others, and the problems that this creates as regards the possibility of earning a  living  can
have serious repercussions on the enjoyment of her private life.”[45]
Lord Neuberger added:
“An applicant’s exclusion from a large  sector  of  the  job  market  (especially,  it  seems  to  me,  a  socially
important and vocationally driven sector) will frequently have a significant effect on her private life, in terms
of career satisfaction, development of personal relationships and ability to earn a living.”[46]
These cases show that where someone is prevented from pursuing a chosen career or working in a “large sector of  the
job market”, Article 8 is engaged because of the interference with a person’s right to make human relationships. None
of the judgments suggested anything wider than that, to encompass, for instance, the situation of being fired from  one
job, but not barred from pursuing a chosen career, or  participating  in  the  job  market  generally.  However,  there  is
another dimension apparent from this case law which  recognises  the  scenario  where  dismissal  from  one  job  may
effectively bar a person from their chosen career.
An additional and aggravating factor for Sidabras was the public obloquy of being associated with a previous
oppressive regime. The Court noted:
“... as a result of the  publicity  caused  by  the  adoption  of  the  ‘KGB  Act’  [the  applicants]  ...  have  been
subjected to daily embarrassment as a result of their past activities. ... the applicants continue to labour under
the  status  of  ‘former  KGB  officers’  and  that  fact  may  of  itself  be  considered  an  impediment  to   the
establishment of contacts with  the  outside  world  -  be  they  employment-related  or  other  -  and  that  this
situation undoubtedly affects more than just their reputation; it also affects  the  enjoyment  of  their  ‘private
life’”.[47]
In Wright, Baroness Hale observed:
“The ban is also likely to have an effect in practice going beyond its effect in law. Even though  the  lists  are
not made public, the fact is likely to get about and the stigma will be considerable.”[48]
And in L v Metropolitan Police, Lord Hope noted:
“She is entitled also to have her good name  and  reputation  protected.  ...  the  fact  that  a  person  has  been
excluded from employment is likely to get about and, if it does, the stigma will be considerable.”[49]
Clearly, any stigma associated with a ban or dismissal is an aggravating factor. In this context,  a  stigma  can  do  two
things. First, it could influence employers beyond the formal ban not to hire the  victim:  in  some  cases  at  least,  the
signal to prospective employers is that this victim was so little valued to be  expendable.  Second,  it  can  damage  the
victim’s reputation with the resulting harm to her or his social life. Being “expendable”,  for  instance,  could  damage
the victim’s self-esteem and confidence to mix socially.
The cases (Sidabras, Wright, and L) did not isolate precisely what role stigma, in itself, plays in an Article 8  claim.  It
would appear from the judgments that stigma was an aggravating factor in each case. It prompts the question  whether
Article 8 could be engaged where stigma is the principal or sole cause of the  damage  to  the  victim’s  right  to  make
human relationships. Take for instance, a case where the victim was fired, but with no formal  restrictions  (e.g.  being
disbarred) on her job opportunities. However, the  “expendable”  stigma  associated  with  the  dismissal  significantly
reduced her chances of finding employment in the same occupation. If the effect of  the  dismissal  were  of  a  similar
nature and scale as that in, say, Sidabras, it would seem that Article  8  should  be  engaged.  In  principle,  and  in  the
context of Article 8, the case is no different from one where a formal bar to employment similarly affects the  victim’s
ability to make human relationships.
The second suggestion above (“self-esteem”) envisages that only the victim’s social life (in addition to the  loss
of a job) was affected, but again, with the same “Article 8 effect” on her ability make  human  relationships.  It  would
seem that provided the damage were severe enough, there is no reason why Article 8 should not be engaged. The only
hesitancy over this conclusion would be the limit of Article 8 expressed in Botta. However, the Botta  pronouncement
concerned interpersonal relations that were too “broad and indeterminate” to engage Article 8. This does not rule  out
of  Article  8  all  social  scenarios.  Access  to  a  beach  is  distinguishable  from  a  general  ability  to  make   human
relationships. The Court stated in Sidabras that Article 8 covered  “an  impediment  to  the  establishment  of  contacts
with the outside world - be they employment-related or other”.[50] This presumably means social contacts, as it could
hardly mean much else. In any case, it would at the least include social contacts.
In conclusion, none of this case law directly suggests  that  victimising  associates  of  complainants  should,  in  itself,
engage Article 8. But it does suggest that Article 8 should be engaged in some cases. Claims under Article 8,  thus  far
interpreted, would be fact-sensitive. It might be that the victim’s career lies in a particularly narrow field, or that there
are relatively few employers, or it is at a time of high unemployment either within  the  relevant  sector,  or  generally.
Academics will be aware of some of these factors. They tend to specialise in a narrow branch of their discipline. Their
places of employment  (mainly  universities)  are  thinly  spread,  which  either  narrows  the  opportunities  further  or
demands relocation. Academic disciplines tend have a nationwide, if not worldwide network, and so word will spread
and any stigma could well impede job opportunities, as well as the victim’s social life. Other  examples  could  be  the
police force, the private security sector, legal profession. More obvious cases here might involve the exclusion from  a
monopolistic trade association or  qualifying  body.[51]  Once  again,  we  see  that  certain  instances  of  third  party
victimisation could violate, or at least engage, Article 8, depending upon the severity of the  effect  of  the  victimising
act. But this is theoretical and speculative, and offers no certainty for all instances.
Article 14 - discrimination
Where the severity of the victimisation is enough to engage,  but  not  violate,  Article  8,  Article  14  may  provide  a
solution. The Convention gives no free-standing right  against  discrimination,[52]  but  Article  14  provides  that  the
rights and freedoms in  the  Convention  must  be  “secured”  without  discrimination.  There  is  no  need  to  prove  a
violation of a substantive right for claims of  discrimination.  Were  it  otherwise,  Article  14  would  serve  no  useful
purpose, being redundant or, at best, duplicative.
The first task is to establish that Article 8 is engaged.[53] To engage a substantive Article, the general rule is that  the
activity must fall within its “ambit”. For the right to privacy in this context, the “ambit test” would be met by showing
an interference with making human relationships at work or earning a living, or perhaps by stigmatising a  person.  Of
course, it not necessary to show that Article 8 was violated. But in these cases, the principles  that  engaged  Article  8
are rooted in the severity of the effect of the treatment, which is being shut out of  a  large  section  of  the  job  market
and/or or from one’s chosen career. It is a theoretical extension of the case law logic to  hold  that  merely  losing  one
job (but not a career) interferes, be it temporarily,  with  a  person’s  ability  to  make  relationships  or  earn  a  living.
Predicting this becomes rather speculative. A Court guarding civil and political rights  may  not  wish  to  venture  any
further into straightforward employment disputes, which are more social and economic in nature. On  the  other  hand,
the Court has asserted in this context: “there is no  watertight  division  separating  the  sphere  of  social  and  economic
rights from the field covered by the Convention.”[54] This makes it easier to argue that as  privacy  and  equality  are
fundamental human rights,[55] whether they are threatened in the workplace or elsewhere is secondary  to  the  threat
itself. If Article 8 is engaged, Article 14 becomes live.
Article 14 provides that the Convention rights must be secured without discrimination on  any  ground  “such  as  sex,
race, colour, language,  religion,  political  or  other  opinion,  national  or  social  origin,  association  with  a  national
minority, property, birth or other status”. Not only are the specific examples far wider  than  covered  by  the  equality
Directives,  it  is  clear  that  the  use  of  the  phrases  such  as  and  or  other  status  (a  fortiori  the   French   version
toute autre  situation)[56]  opens  Article  14  to  more  grounds  than  those  listed.  Among  other  things,  this  non-
exhaustive  formula  allows  for  changing  values,  and   discrimination   that   was   once   acceptable   may   become
unacceptable.[57] The basis for identifying other grounds for protection under Article 14 is vague  but  generous.  The
ECtHR has entertained Article 14 claims from groups as wide-ranging as owners of non-residential buildings (distinct
from residential), owners of pit bull terriers (distinct from other breeds of dog), small landowners (distinct from  large
landowners),  coastal  (distinct  from  open  sea)  fishermen,  foreign  residence,  and  previous   employment   by   the
KGB.[58]
And so, to bring Article 14 into play, third party victims must classified for protection from discrimination. Their only
distinguishing feature (before the treatment) is “being associated with discrimination  complainants”.  This  has  some
resonance with Sidabras,[59] where the ECtHR recognised for  Article  14  those  who  were  once  employed  by  (or
perhaps “associated with”)  the  KGB,  and  found  a  violation  of  Article  14  (in  combination  with  Article  8).  An
association  with  a  person  by  any  number  of  personal  relationships  is  a  more  nebulous  concept  than  previous
employment with a particular body. Much could turn of the type of association, with marriage and “close  relative”  at
one of the scale, moving along to emotional relationships and friendships. Further along the scale could be less strong,
formal and “obligatory” associations, such as in-laws or work colleagues. Of course, classifying these  associations  is
rather offensive because each  could  vary  enormously  in  strength,  and  it  is  the  strength  of  the  relationship  that
motivates the persecutor. Building any sort of coherent case law around such a varying concept could be  the  obstacle
to the ECtHR attempting it.
This tenuous theory could be avoided with a more adventurous approach. A Court  could  adopt  the  Coleman  theory
(above), of discrimination by association with the ground of the principal complaint, such as race,  or  sex.  Then  it  is
arguable that dismissing a third  party  by  their  association  with  the  complainant  is  discrimination  on  one  of  the
conventionally recognised grounds. The “sweeping objection” to the Coleman theory  (made  above)[60]  diminishes
here because the Convention contains no separate victimisation provision  to  render  otiose.  However,  by  extending
discrimination law to encompass victimisation,  the  Court  would  make  it  more  difficult  for  itself  at  some  future
occasion to develop a free-standing concept of victimisation.
An alternative approach would be for the ECtHR to do just that: develop a doctrine of victimisation for Article  14.  It
could do this relying on Article 13 (effective remedy) in  much  the  same  way  as  the  ECJ  relied  on  the  “effective
remedy” Article (6) in the Equal Treatment Directive 76/207/EEC to develop the EU  doctrine  of  victimisation,  now
codified in the equality Directives.[61] In doing so, the Court will not be constrained by niceties of detailed  statutory
formulas.
In any of these approaches, it would be relatively easy to prove that a person in an analogous situation would not have
been treated in the same way. And given the invidious nature of this victimisation, it would be most  unlikely  that  an
employer could justify such discrimination or victimisation.
In conclusion, there are difficulties in applying Article 14 to these cases. First, it might prove  difficult  in  less  severe
cases to show that Article 8 is  engaged.  Second,  bringing  Article  14  into  play  would  entail  either  recognising  a
tenuously defined group, or importing the Coleman theory of association discrimination, or developing  a  new  strand
of victimisation to Article 14.
General Principles of EU Law
Given the rather cumbersome options of the equality Directive definitions, or tenuous options  under  the  Convention
on Human Rights, we return  to  the  broader  statutory  formulas,  found  in  the  equality  Directives.  There  are  two
complimentary principles  relevant  here.  First,  the  prohibition  of  deterrents  to  workers  using  the  discrimination
legislation (Coote).[62] Second, remedies must be sufficient to deter employers  from  discriminating  (Marshall),[63]
or be “dissuasive”, as the equality Directives instruct under their “Sanctions” articles.[64] It was noted above  that  the
wording of the victimisation provisions in the Framework and Recast Directives is not broad enough to  cover  all  the
Classes, notably those involving a second employer. What is required is an overarching general principle which is not
bound by the niceties of the legislative formulas. There are two possibilities.
Effective Judicial Protection
In 1986, the ECJ in Johnston v RUC[65] expressed the view that the Equal Treatment Directive  (ETD),[66]  Article
6 (effective remedy), “reflects a general principle of law”.[67] We then saw Coote building on Johnston  and  Article
6 to establish the now-familiar rubric prohibiting victimisation,  expressed  in  the  equality  Directives.  Johnston  and
Coote concerned access to Court. Marshall built upon Article 6 to provide access  to  a  full  remedy.[68]  Finally,  in
Francovich,[69] the ECJ held that  a  member  State  could  be  liable  to  an  individual  for  failing  to  implement  a
Directive, thus denying the individual an effective remedy under EC law.[70] This shows  that  it  is  not  beyond  the
ECJ to create a new cause of action to give effect to a general principle.
What becomes apparent  is  that,  Article  6  (ETD),  the  “deterrent”  principles  of  Coote  and  Marshall,  the
“dissuasive”  principle  and  prohibitions  against  victimisation   in   the   equality   Directives,   are   merely   specific
expressions of a general principle of judicial protection.[71] As such, their  precise  wording  should  not  restrict  the
general principle. That would be the tail wagging the dog. Quite clearly,  if  third  party  victimisation  passes  without
redress, or with only partial redress (e.g.  where  the  principal  claimant  sues  also  for  victimisation),  claimants  are
deterred from seeking a remedy and employers are not dissuaded from intimidating them. This applies equally  across
all the scenarios. This general principle provides the most solid ground for a remedy to all three Classes of third  party
victimisation.
As such, the victim should be permitted to sue, even if this means creating a new  cause  of  action
(Francovich). It may be that for some reason, the victim may  not  sue.  This  could  occur  where,  for  example,  the
employer merely threatens to dismiss the principal claimant’s spouse,  should  the  claimant  not  abandon  her  claim.
Here,  principal  claimant  should  be  able  to  sue  her   employer   and   claim   damages   enough   to   dissuade   the
employer.[72]
General Principle of Equality
Just as the victimisation and sanctions provisions of the equality Directives are expressions of the general principle  of
effective judicial protection, the main thrust of these Directives is an expression of the  general  principle  of  equality.
This brings  a  remedy  for  third  party  victimisation  a  step  closer  for  purely  private  disputes.  In  Swedex,[73]  a
private employer relied on a German Civil  Code  exception  to  the  age  discrimination  principle,  generally  to  give
younger workers shorter notice periods. The exception was incompatible with the Framework Directive and of  course
the general principle of  equality.  The  ECJ  held  that  a  domestic  court  should  disapply  the  state  exception,  thus
facilitating an action by the victim against the private employer. In holding so, the ECJ relied on the general  principle
of equality.[74]
Conclusion
With the purpose of the equality Directives in mind, there are a number of factors which should push the ECJ towards
recognising these claims. First, the general principle of judicial protection, which  is  broad  enough  to  create  a  new
cause of action if necessary. This factor alone should be enough. Second, the twin principles  already  associated  with
the  equality  Directives  of  removing  deterrents  to  claimants  and  potential  claimants  (the   chilling   effect),   and
dissuading employers from intimidating them. Third, the recognition of third party victimisation is - conceptually - no
more ground-breaking than the already recognised third party discrimination and harassment (Coleman). Last, there is
potential in Article 8 and Article 14 (ECHR) to cover some cases.
It is clear, that to address third party victimisation, the existing definitions of victimisation require  reformulating  and
expressed to cover all three Classes outlined in  the  introduction.  The  obvious  solution  is  for  the  Framework  and
Recast Directives to adopt the more open formula from  the  Race  Directive  and  add  the  scenarios  as  examples  of
victimisation covered by that formula. The phrase  as  a  reaction  to  in  that  formula  ensures  that  there  must  be  a
connection between the employer’s act and the principal complainant’s act, thus excluding any meritless claims.
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